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Abstract
Children copy the actions of others with high fidelity, even when they are not causally relevant. This copying of visibly
unnecessary actions is termed overimitation. Many competing theories propose mechanisms for overimitation behaviour.
The present study examines these theories by studying the social factors that lead children to overimitate actions. Ninety-
four children aged 5- to 8-years each completed five trials of an overimitation task. Each trial provided the opportunity to
overimitate an action on familiar objects with minimal causal reasoning demands. Social cues (live or video demonstration)
and eye contact from the demonstrator were manipulated. After the imitation, children’s ratings of action rationality were
collected. Substantial overimitation was seen which increased with age. In older children, overimitation was higher when
watching a live demonstrator and when eye contact was absent. Actions rated as irrational were more likely to be imitated
than those rated as rational. Children overimitated actions on familiar objects even when they rated those actions as
irrational, suggesting that failure of causal reasoning cannot be driving overimitation. Our data support social explanations
of overimitation and show that the influence of social factors increases with age over the 5- to 8-year-old age range.
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Introduction
Observation and imitation of other people’s actions is an
important way for children to learn about the world, reducing the
need for costly trial-and-error [1] and see [2] for a review).
However, learning by observation is complicated by the fact that
some objects are not transparent in their mechanism [3] and on
some occasions the demonstrator may behave inefficiently due to
habit, error, or lack of experience with the object. In order to
efficiently interact with an object, the child must filter out actions
that are causally necessary from those that do not contribute to the
completion of the action [4]. Failure to exclude unnecessary
actions from a sequence is termed overimitation [5], whereas
efficient pursuit of a goal alone is termed goal emulation [6]. In
this paper we investigate which cues influence children’s imitation
fidelity and how these cues change with development.
Horner and Whiten [7] demonstrated that chimpanzees are
remarkably good at goal emulation if information about action
causality is available. However, in the same task, a group of 3- to
4-year-old children failed to emulate the goal of the action, instead
choosing to faithfully imitate both the necessary and unnecessary
actions demonstrated. Many subsequent studies have demonstrat-
ed that from around 14 months of age, children overimitate
actions, despite visible evidence that they are not causally relevant
[5,8–11].
There are multiple theories which attempt to explain over-
imitation in children. Broadly speaking, these theories fall into
causal reasoning explanations and social explanations, although
nuances within these categories are debated. Firstly, causal
reasoning explanations follow the argument that if a demonstrated
action upon an object is perceived as intentional, the child will
believe that the action is important. This judgement of importance
may be due to the demonstration distorting the child’s causal
understanding of the object such that they believe the action is
necessary to achieve the goal (automatic causal encoding
hypothesis, [5]) or it may be judged as important but that the
purpose of the action is unknown (unspecified purpose hypothesis,
[7,11]). In this case, it is a ‘safe bet’ to copy everything and to
refine later [11]. Alternatively, social hypotheses propose that
overimitation performs a social function. Either the child has a
desire to be like the demonstrator and finds it intrinsically
rewarding to share their experiences (shared experience hypoth-
esis, [12,13]) or they want to communicate ‘likeness’ with the
demonstrator in an attempt to affiliate (affiliation hypothesis, [14]).
Finally, a recent theory proposes that children learn prescriptive
norms about the ‘right way’ to do things when actions are
demonstrated. Therefore overimitation occurs because children
are conforming to these perceived norms (normative behaviour
hypothesis, [15,16]).
There is very little consensus over which of these processes may
be driving overimitation; some may work in combination, or at
different ages. One previous review paper argues that all of these
hypotheses can explain some part of overimitation behaviour by
emphasising the role of the child’s goal in an imitative situation
[17]. This theory can also explain the co-occurrence of selective
imitation and overimitation in children. Over and Carpenter
propose that a child can adopt a social goal, a learning goal or a
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learn-to-be-social goal in an imitative situation and this goal
determines whether they faithfully or selectively imitate. With a
social goal, their priority is to imitate the model faithfully as this
serves an affiliative function, similar to mimicry. Evidence for this
account comes from studies showing more overimitation when a
child interacted with a sociable demonstrator compared to a
demonstrator who was socially aloof [13], and when the
demonstration was presented live rather than in a video [10,18].
Additionally, children primed by observing ostracism were more
likely to overimitate than children who witnessed a comparable
scenario without ostracism [14]. In contrast, under a learning goal
children are more likely to be selective in their imitation. This is
evidenced by a study which demonstrates that children given a
social copying task prior to an overimitation task were more likely
to overimitate than those children given a collaborative learning
task first [19]. Here, the child’s goal is changed by the aims of the
initial task. Finally, Over and Carpenter [17] propose that with a
learning-to-be-social goal, the child aims to learn the social rules of
a given situation. This view parallels the normative behaviour
hypothesis and explains why children justify their overimitation in
terms of normative language [15] and protest when someone else
omits the unnecessary action [16]. While the theory proposed by
Over and Carpenter [17] has good explanatory power and pulls
together a diverse range of theories, it is not yet clear how children
adopt a specific goal and what cues they use to switch between
them.
One potential reason for the diversity in explanations of
overimitation behaviour may be because the field is muddied by
the diverse range of overimitation tasks and the precise definition
of overimitation. Originally, overimitation was classed as the
imitation of visibly irrelevant actions [7]. However, the objects used
in demonstrations vary considerably with respect to how
mechanically complex they are (complex: [9] vs simple: [20])
and whether they are transparent [9,10,21] or opaque [12,22].
Many studies make the assumption that because an object is
physically transparent, the actions performed upon it are
cognitively transparent to children, however a recent study
demonstrates that children make errors in ascribing action
relevance for even very simple objects [15]. Therefore, children’s
replication of actions on these more complex objects may be due
to object learning, rather than social drives [20]. This can explain
why causal reasoning explanations have been provided for studies
involving overimitation on mechanically complex objects [9].
Recent studies have also extended the definition of overimitation
to include faithful imitation of tool selection [14] and tool use
(when it is simpler to use your hand, [18]) or imitation of the
number of irrelevant actions performed [23]. These can be
considered faithful reproductions of action but may be functionally
different to classic overimitation in which a causally irrelevant
action is completed. To ensure that children understand the
mechanics of how each object works, and therefore ensure that the
irrelevant action is visibly so, the present study utilises very simple,
transparent objects that have no mechanical components and do
not involve the use of tools to operate. Furthermore, irrelevant
actions on the objects are hand actions that do not result in
physical outcomes (noises or changes to the appearance of the
object). This should prevent object-learning based imitation being
coded as overimitation.
In the present study, we test how overimitation is modulated by
social cues, causal reasoning and a child’s age. First, we suggest
that children will adopt a social goal and overimitate for social
reasons if the learning component of the task is reduced. To test
this, we compare rates of overimitation for live and video
demonstrations using simple, non-mechanical objects. Previous
studies suggest children copy more when seeing a live demonstra-
tion compared to a video demonstration [10], and this increase in
overimitation persists when the demonstration is given via a live
video feed compared to a pre-recorded video [18]. These data
suggest that the opportunity for social interaction drives increased
overimitation rather than the reduced quality of the video leading
to a performance deficit [24]. We predict that in our task, children
will overimitate despite the objects being causally transparent and
that overimitation will increase for the live demonstration
condition.
We also test the role of another social cue – eye contact – in
influencing imitation behaviour. Eye contact is a powerful
ostensive cue which may signal communicative intent to an
observer [25,26]. Within the context of a social learning task,
direct eye contact may highlight a particular action as relevant or
important to the observer in a way that promotes teaching and
learning [25,27]. Therefore, we should expect direct eye contact
to increase overimitation when a task requires object learning.
Indeed, Brugger et al [4] showed that 14-to 16-month-olds
overimitate following social engagement (eye contact and a
relevant comment) more than a non-engagement condition (look
to wall and an irrelevant comment). However, the study by
Brugger et al. [4] does not distinguish between the verbal and
eye contact cues. Further, these cues were presented at the start
of each action sequence and so we cannot say whether the cue is
increasing general attention to the demonstration or whether it is
specifically prompting the infant to complete the unnecessary
action. Finally, a recent study presents contrasting results
suggesting that eye contact may reduce imitation in young
children [28]. The present study investigates the role of eye
contact in an overimitation paradigm further by examining
whether eye contact modulates overimitation when it precedes a
necessary or an unnecessary action. In addition, we assess the
effect of eye contact on overimitation for familiar objects.
The manipulation of eye contact also allows us to examine the
relationship between overimitation and mimicry. Mimicry is the
spontaneous copying of actions which have no goal. Some theories
suggest that social overimitation and mimicry are functionally
related [14], because they are modulated by the same social
conditions. For example, overimitation and mimicry both increase
when interacting with people with high social status compared to
low social status [21,29,30], and both decrease following exposure
to ostracism cues [14,31,32]. We also know that eye contact
enhances mimicry [33], which implies that it should enhance
overimitation too. Thus, our eye contact manipulation will provide
a test of whether mimicry and overimitation are modulated in the
same way for this type of social cue.
Another puzzling feature to emerge from studies of over-
imitation is that this behaviour actually increases throughout early
childhood (ages 2- to 5-year-olds [10,34], and remains in
adulthood [34,35]. One previous study has looked at overimitation
in children across a wider age range (2-to 13-year-olds) in Kalahari
Bushmen children [22]. Again, an increase in overimitation is
reported in this sample yet the authors do not discuss the
implications of this finding. We hypothesise that an increase in
overimitation may be due to increasing sensitivity to social cues
throughout development. As children start school and form new
friendships outside their family group, their social skills are likely to
improve and their propensity to overimitate may also increase. If
there is a relationship between overimitation and social skill
development, this relationship should emerge most clearly within
the period that these social skills develop. The present study will
systematically test how imitation fidelity changes over the 5- to 8-
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year age range and assess whether these changes are related to
changing sensitivity to social cues.
A further way in which to test whether overimitation is socially
motivated is to ask participants to explicitly rate the actions as
necessary or unnecessary. In a previous study, 5-year-old children
were asked to report whether they will perform the unnecessary
action and to justify their decision prior to acting [15]. While only
10% of participants justified the unnecessary action as causally
relevant, the remaining 90% were unable to justify why they
would complete the unnecessary action. However, a caveat of this
study is that children were only included in the analysis if they
completed the unnecessary actions. It is interesting to study the
differences in ratings between children who choose to faithfully
imitate and those who do not as this may provide insight into their
decision-making process.
Overall, the present study will test four hypotheses. Firstly, if
overimitation is socially modulated then overimitation will occur
more in situations that elicit more social engagement. Thus,
unnecessary actions that are demonstrated live will be over-
imitated more frequently than those demonstrated in a video. The
second hypothesis examines the role of eye contact in over-
imitation. If overimitation and mimicry are operating on the same
social mechanisms [17], then eye contact prior to an unnecessary
action should increase overimitation of that action, as it does for
mimicry [33]. Third, this study will investigate the developmental
change in overimitation. Previous studies have reported over-
imitation in children aged between 14-months and 13-years or in
adults but no study has tried to link developmental changes in
overimitation behaviour to the development of other social and
cognitive processes. Finally, no previous study has linked over-
imitation behaviour to explicit ratings of the rationality of the
demonstrated actions. If children overimitate for causal reasons,
they should report all actions as sensible whereas if they are
socially overimitating, they should report the unnecessary action as
silly.
Method
Participants
All parents gave written, informed consent and the study was
approved by the University of Nottingham Ethics committee.
Ninety-four children aged 5- to 8-years took part in this
experiment. The final sample consisted of 26 five-year olds (16
female), 25 six-year-olds (8 female), 22 seven-year-olds (12 female)
and 21 eight-year-olds (11 female). Children were recruited
through the ‘summer scientists week’ scheme at the University of
Nottingham. Groups of children from the local area were invited
to come and take part in a fun session of games and experiments
during their summer holidays.
Design
A mixed model design was used. Children were randomly
assigned to one of two between-participant experimental condi-
tions (live demonstration or video demonstration) that were
matched for age and gender. Eye contact was manipulated within
participants. Eye contact was counterbalanced for action (either
preceding a rational or irrational action) and for trial (which
apparatus was used) across participants.
Stimuli
The action sequences used in the practice and experimental
trials are detailed in Table 1. Movies were created for each trial of
the video demonstration condition. These commenced with a
demonstrator (D) sitting at a table with the trial apparatus in front
of her. Over the course of the movie, D performed the sequence of
actions required to complete the goal (see Table 1). Within each
trial D once paused and looked at the camera for approximately
1 second before looking down and continuing the action. The eye
contact either directly preceded a rational action or directly
preceded an irrational action. Thus, two versions of each
demonstration were filmed. For example, when building the block
tower, version one shows D place block one in the centre of the
table, pause and look directly at the camera, then continue by
picking up block two, rotating it 360 degrees before placing it on
block one (in this case, eye contact occurred directly prior to the
irrational action) and finally placing block three on top of block
two. Version two shows exactly the same action sequence but the
pause and eye contact occurred before picking up block one
(directly prior to a rational action).
Procedure
For testing, each child sat at a child-size table next to the
experimenter (E). Parents were present if the child preferred it, and
sat behind the child so that they were not distracting. A video
camera recorded the child’s actions to allow independent coding of
imitation behaviour.
All children started the experiment by completing two practice
trials. Practice trials were included to ensure that the participants
were able to meet the basic motor demands of the task. They also
familiarised participants with the routine of the study – first they
watched an adult playing with some toys, then they will be given
the opportunity to play themselves. During piloting this was found
to reduce the child’s attempts to reach out for the objects before
the demonstration. In practice trial 1, E said ‘I am going to make a
pattern with some beads on this peg. When I am done, I would like you to
make the same pattern on a different peg so watch me carefully’. E then
placed three beads, one at a time, onto a peg. She then offered the
three remaining beads to the child and said ‘Now it is your turn, can
you make a pattern on this peg’ (pointing to a different peg). Praise was
given on completion, regardless of whether the same or a different
pattern was made. For practice trial 2, E said ‘Next up, we are going to
play with my doll called Ted. He wants to hide in the pot. Watch me carefully
and then you will get a turn to hide Ted.’ E then takes the lid off the pot,
places Ted in and puts the lid back on. When finished, E then
takes Ted out of the pot, hands him to the child and says ‘Now it is
your turn, can you hide Ted in the pot?’ Upon completion, E praised the
child. All the children were able to complete both of the practice
trials without difficulty.
After the practice trials, the experimental trials began. E said
‘Now we are going to play with some more toys but this time you can see Kate
playing first. Let’s see what toys Kate has.’ For children assigned to the
video demonstration condition, E produced a laptop and placed it
in front of the child. E then ran a matlab script which presented
the trials in a random order. Each trial started with E saying ‘Look
Kate has a toy [duck]’ whilst showing the child a picture of the last
frame of the movie that depicted the end goal of the action. E then
continued by saying ‘Kate is going to show you how she got the [duck] out
of the box’, watch her carefully and then you will get a turn.’ E then played
the movie demonstration. Once the movie was over, E put the
laptop to one side (still displaying the end goal on the screen) and
gave the child the apparatus whilst saying ‘Can you get the [duck] out’,
do it as quickly as you can’. The name in square brackets was
substituted on each trial for the name of the object to be retrieved
or built. Note here that the instructions emphasise the action goal
and speed, but not the means by which the action is achieved. This
instruction ensures that children clearly understand their goal in
the situation and should reduce any copying that is driven by
demand characteristics. These instructions have been used
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previously and rates of overimitation are comparable to studies
with other instructions [20]. The child attempted the task, was
praised and then started a new trial.
Once all five trials were completed, the children were then
shown 10 short clips from the action sequences again. Five of
these were rational actions and 5 were irrational, presented in a
random order. After the clip, they were given a 5-point scale
with a smartly dressed man above the 1 and a clown above the
5. They were asked how sensible (E points to the smartly dressed
man) or how silly (E points to the clown) was that action? E
noted down the child’s verbal or point response and moved on to
the next clip.
The procedure for children assigned to the live demonstration
condition was the same as for the video demonstration except
there was no laptop. E had laminated photographs of the goal of
the action to put in front of the child. Trial order was randomised
by shuffling the photos between each participant. E’s script was
identical to the video condition. When it was time for the
demonstration, a demonstrator (D) brought the apparatus to the
table and sat directly opposite the child. When cued by E, D
performed the action sequence. Then D reset the stimulus objects
to their original configuration behind a screen, then removed the
screen and moved out of sight. E then handed the object to the
child, with the same instructions as the video condition.
Throughout the live demonstrations, a second video camera was
positioned to capture D’s actions in order to check that the live
demonstration was accurate. After all five trials, D came back and
performed the same 10 sections of the action sequences that were
used in the video ratings. After each, the child was presented with
the sensible/silly action rating scale and was asked by E to rate the
action.
In addition to the overimitation task, each child completed the
British Picture Vocabulary Scale II (BPVS-II), a standard measure
of verbal abilities [36] with a separate researcher and parents
completed the Social Aptitudes Scale (SAS, [37]), a general
measure of social abilities. These measures were completed to
check that participants in the live and video groups did not differ
on verbal ability or social skills and were entered as predictors in a
regression model to predict overimitation.
Coding and Data Analysis
All coding was based on the video recordings. The coder was
blind to the eye contact condition whilst coding the movies.
However, the coder was able to tell whether the child had received
live or video demonstrations based on the experimental setup. For
each trial, the coder was asked to judge whether the goal of the
action was achieved and whether the irrational action was
performed by the child. The irrational action was judged to be
performed if the child made a definite and purposeful movement
on the object, as described in Table 1. For each trial, the child was
awarded a score of 1 for each irrational action completed and 0
otherwise. Therefore, each child had a total score out of 5 for
overimitation. Data from 35 children (37%) were double coded by
an independent coder. Overall agreement between coders was
93%. Cohen’s Kappa = 0.92.
All children were able to achieve the goal of each action so this
was not analysed. There were no significant gender differences or
gender by overimitation interactions within this dataset so gender
shall not be considered further. Table 2 shows participant statistics
for each randomly-allocated group. As there was a group
difference for BPVS and SAS scores (see Table 2), all analyses
include these scores as covariates to partial out the variance
attributed them.
For data analysis, we ran three ANCOVAs to test each of our
three main research questions (every model included age as a
factor), followed by a logistic regression incorporating all variables.
Table 1. Descriptions of each action within each trial.
Goal Action 1 Action 2 Action 3
Practice trials
Make a pattern with beads
on the rack
Place bead 1 onto a peg Place bead 2 on top of bead 1 Place bead 3 on top of bead 2
Put doll into a container Remove lid from container Put doll into the container Put lid back on container
Experimental trials
Retrieve toy duck from box 1 Unclip fastenings of box (R) Tap the top of the box twice
with index finger (I)
Remove the lid of the box and retrieve
duck (R)
Retrieve toy elephant from box 2 Remove elastic band (R) Slide box along the table and
back again (I)
Remove the lid of the box and retrieve
elephant (R)
Retrieve toy lion from box 3 Pull box towards you (R) Stroke the top of the box twice with
index finger (I)
Remove the end of the box and retrieve
lion (R)
Build tower of blocks Place block 1 in centre of table (R) Turn block 2 360u (I) Place block 2 on top of block 1 and place
block 3 on top of block 2 (R)
Make a paper fan Gather up concertina paper (R) Tap paper on the table twice (I) Fold the paper in half to produce a fan (R)
(R) indicates a rational action. (I) indicates an irrational action.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086127.t001
Table 2. Participant group characteristics.
Live Video Difference (p)
N 42 52
Age 6y9m (1y1m) 6y8m(1y1m) 0.67
BPVS 109.9 (10.6) 115.6 (10.2) 0.01
SAS 26.2 (5.1) 23.3 (5.6) 0.01
Overimitation 2.9 (1.9) 1.2 (1.5) 0.001
Numbers displayed are group means (and standard deviations) for participants
in each condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086127.t002
Social Modulation of Imitation
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 January 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 1 | e86127
First, we compared the effect of live and video demonstration. The
total overimitation score out of five for each child was entered into
a univariate ANCOVA, with demonstration type entered as a
between-participant factor and age in years and months, SAS and
BPVS entered as covariates.
Second, the effects of eye contact on overimitation were
analysed on a trial by trial basis, due to an unequal number of
trials with and without eye contact per child (either two or three).
Thus, demonstration type, direct eye contact preceding an
irrational action and apparatus type were entered into a univariate
ANCOVA as between trial factors and age, BPVS and SAS were
added as covariates. Interaction terms for demonstration type and
eye contact with age and demonstration type with eye contact
were also entered into the model.
Third, rationality ratings were analysed by calculating a
rationality difference score for each trial, by subtracting the child’s
rating of the rational action from their rating of the irrational
action. Thus each trial for each child had a rationality rating
ranging from 24 (irrational actions rated as more rational than
rational actions) to 4 (irrational actions rated as more irrational
than rational actions). A score of 0 reflected no perceived
difference in rationality between the rational and irrational action.
We tested if overimitation on a trial is related to the later
rationality rating given on that trial. Rationality difference scores
were also analysed on a trial-by-trial basis and entered as the
dependant variable into a univariate ANCOVA. Overimitation
behaviour, eye-contact and demonstration type were entered as a
between trial factors and age, BPVS and SAS were entered as
covariates.
Finally, we performed a binary logistic regression to establish
which factors are good predictors of overimitation behaviour.
Age, BVPS, SAS, demonstration type, eye contact and rationality
ratings were entered as single variables and demonstrator eye
contact by age, demonstrator eye contact by condition and
rationality ratings by age were entered as interaction terms. All
variables were entered into a backwards likelihood ratio model.
Results
Sixty-two percent of children completed at least one unneces-
sary action in at least one trial in this sample. Rates of
overimitation, split by demonstration condition and apparatus
type are presented in Table 3. Participants in the live demonstra-
tion condition consistently overimitated more compared to those
in the video demonstration condition. Overimitation behaviour
also differed by apparatus type as participants overimitated least
on the fan trial compared to all other apparatus types. Apparatus
type was therefore modelled as a nuisance variable in all analyses
and will not be considered further.
Video vs Live Demonstration
Percentage overimitation for each age group as a function of
demonstration type is presented in Figure 1. A significant main
effect of demonstration type revealed that children were more
likely to overimitate a model who demonstrated the action live,
compared to a video demonstration (F(1,77) = 15.035, p,0.0001).
There was also main effect of age (F(1,77) = 4.50, p,0.05),
showing that older children were more likely to overimitate than
younger children. No main effect of BPVS (F(1,77) = 0.09,
p = 0.76) or SAS (F(1,77) = 0.14, p = 0.71) was found. Further-
more, when analysing a subset of the data in which groups were
matched for BPVS and SAS (n = 39 in each condition), the same
pattern of results was observed.
Eye Contact Preceding Irrational Actions
Percentage overimitation for each age group as a function of
preceding eye contact is presented in Figure 2. As with the
previous analysis, a main effect of demonstration type
(F(1,367) = 46.73, p,0.0001) and a main effect of age
(F(1,367) = 7.05, p = 0.008) was present. No main effect of eye
contact preceding an irrational action is reported (F(1,367) = 0.01,
p = 0.97) although a significant age by eye contact interaction was
found (F(1,367) = 5.99, p = 0.01). A post hoc t-test shows that this
interaction is driven by an increase in overimitation in the older
children when eye contact is absent (t(225) = 2.04, p = 0.04). In
addition, an interaction between age and demonstration type
(F(1,367) = 4.82, p = 0.03) was found. This suggests that as children
get older, they are more likely to overimitate the live (t(214) = 2.48,
p = 0.01) but not the video condition (t(263) =20.26, p = 0.79).
Rationality Ratings
Rationality difference ratings as a function of overimitation
behaviour are presented in Figure 3. Children who overimitated
an action subsequently rated that action as more irrational than
the actions that they did not overimitate (F(1,364) = 3.89,
p = 0.05). In addition, older children reported larger rationality
differences between rational and irrational actions, compared to
younger children (F(1,364) = 16.92, p,0.001). Effects of eye
contact (F(1,364) = 0.31, p = 0.58), demonstration type
(F(1,364) = 3.74, p = 0.06), BPVS (F(1,364) = 3.28, p= 0.07) and
SAS (F(1,364) = 1.33, p = 0.25) were not significant.
Predictors of overimitation behaviour
We used a logistic regression model to determine which of all
the factors measured in this study best predicts overimitation
behaviour. Results are shown in Table 4. The final model
accounted for 26% of the variance in overimitation behaviour
(NagelKerke R2= 0.259) using four of ten variables. Firstly,
overimitation was most likely when participants saw a live
demonstration, compared to a video demonstration. Second,
overimitation occurred less when participants were given the fan
trial compared to all other trials. Rationality ratings predicted
overimitation as the higher the rationality difference rating, the
more likely the participant was to overimitate. Lastly, an age by
eye contact interaction was also a significant predictor of
overimitation, showing that in the older children, eye contact
reduced propensity to overimitate. Child age, the age by
rationality rating interaction, BPVS, SAS, demonstrator eye
contact and the demonstration type by rationality rating interac-
tion did not predict overimitation behaviour. Overall, this model
Table 3. Percentage of trials in which overimitation occurred,
split by demonstration and apparatus type.
Trial Type Live: Video: Rationality
% overimitation % overimitation Difference Ratings
Blocks 70 23 1.43 (1.97)
Duck 70 31 2.20 (1.75)
Elephant 65 19 1.94 (1.75)
Fan 23 15 1.71 (1.86)
Lion 72 31 2.14 (1.70)
Mean (and standard deviation) of rationality difference ratings for each
apparatus type.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086127.t003
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was able to correctly predict overimitation behaviour on 73% of
trials using these four variables.
Discussion
The present study aimed to identify the social modulators of
overimitation whilst reducing the demands of causal inference. We
Figure 1. Overimitation score for younger and older children (based on a median split) as a function of demonstration type. The use
of a median split for age is for visualisation purposes only; all analyses were run using age as a linear covariate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086127.g001
Figure 2. Overimitation score for younger and older children (based on a median split) as a function of preceding eye contact. The
use of a median split is for visualisation purposes only; all analyses were run using age as a linear covariate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086127.g002
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found substantial levels of overimitation which increased with age,
despite testing older children than previous studies and using
simple objects with minimal causal reasoning demands. The data
also show that social cues had a larger impact on older children,
who overimitated more following live demonstrations but less
following eye contact. Finally, actions that were rated as least
rational were more likely to be copied than the actions rated as
more rational. We discuss what our results mean for social models
of overimitation, causal reasoning models, and the development of
overimitation in turn.
Social models of overimitation
Based on previous studies [4,13], we predicted that over-
imitation would increase with increases in social engagement,
that is, with live demonstration and with eye contact. Our
predictions were confirmed for the video compared to live
demonstration comparison. Across all ages in our sample, the live
demonstrator was copied with higher fidelity than the videoed
demonstrator. This effect is most likely to be because the social
presence is stronger in the live condition. This is consistent with
previous findings which suggest that increased social engagement
elicits higher levels of overimitation [4,13]. Alternatively, a video
deficit in imitation may also explain these findings [38]. It has
been consistently demonstrated that infants show reduced
imitation of video demonstrations compared to live demonstra-
tions. This may be due to the video demonstration being
degraded in quality, reduced in size, reduced from 3D to 2D or
affording less relevance to the observer (see [39] for a review).
However, the video deficit has not been examined in school-aged
children and it is and is reported to be diminished by the age of
3-years [40]. Therefore, we believe that the most parsimonious
explanation for the increase in overimitation for live demonstra-
tions is the increased affordance for social interaction with the
demonstrator in this condition (see [13] for a more detailed
discussion of this issue).
In contrast, the eye contact manipulation did not yield the
predicted results. Previous studies show that socially cued action
sequences were overimitated more than uncued action sequences
[4], and adults mimic faster following an eye contact cue [33]. If
overimitation and mimicry are dependent on the same underlying
mechanism [17], we would predict that direct eye contact prior to
an unnecessary action should increase the propensity to imitate.
Indeed, studies of social learning indicate that ostensive cues
increase imitation fidelity [28,41,42]. However, the results from
this manipulation were contingent upon the age of the participant.
In the younger children there was no significant effect of eye
contact on overimitation behaviour. In contrast, direct eye contact
prior to an unnecessary action significantly reduced the propensity
to overimitate in the older children.
Figure 3. Mean difference in rationality ratings between rational and irrational actions that were either overimitated or not
overimitated. Results are visualised using a median split for age but all analyses were run using age as a linear covariate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086127.g003
Table 4. Factors entered into the binary logistic regression.
Variable Beta Wald p
Demonstration Type 21.41 34.38 0.0001
Apparatus Type (fan) 21.70 16.28 0.0001
Rationality Ratings 0.14 4.08 0.04
Age x EC 0.48 9.49 0.002
Age Excluded – step 1 - -
Age x Rationality Ratings Excluded – step 2 - -
BVPS Excluded – step 3 - -
SAS Excluded – step 4 - -
Eye Contact Excluded – step 5 - -
Demonstration x EC Excluded – step 6 - -
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086127.t004
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This suggests we may need to re-think the role of eye contact
during overimitation and what it may signal. One possibility is
that as an ostensive cue, eye contact could be interpreted as a
cue to ‘pay attention’ and think about the action performed.
Previous studies have shown that ostensive cueing promotes gaze
following [43] and directs attention towards the object being
manipulated [28]. In the present study, eye contact might serve
to make the children explicitly aware of the unnecessary action
so that they choose not to copy it. This is likely to be particularly
true for the simple objects used in this task as object learning is
precluded. Another possibility is that eye contact may use up
cognitive resources. Esseily and Fagard [28] report a reduction in
imitation immediately following ostensive cueing in 10 month old
infants. They argue that the social information is costly to
process and cognitive resources may be depleted by ostensive
cues. However, this explanation does not fit well with our data as
the reduction in overimitation following eye contact is only
present in the older children in our sample (6 years plus) who
should have more cognitive resources than the younger children.
A third possibility is that eye contact is interpreted as a cue to
learn about the object and thus shifts the child’s goal in the
situation towards learning. According to Over and Carpenter
[17], adopting a learning goal in an imitative task should reduce
overimitation in the manner that we report. However, all of
these are post-hoc explanations and future examination of the
circumstances that alter a child’s goal in an imitative situation
would be valuable. In sum, the present results demonstrate that
eye contact is a subtle cue that can be interpreted in different,
context dependant ways. Further studies will be needed to
understand the relationship between different eye contact cues in
mimicry and those in overimitation.
Causal reasoning models of overimitation
The present study used stimuli which are familiar to the child,
with minimal causal reasoning demands. If causal misattributions
are driving overimitation behaviour, we would expect to see very
little overimitation in this task. Furthermore, we would expect
overimitation behaviour to decrease with age and with rationality
ratings. These predictions do not reflect the pattern of results
that was observed. Sixty-two percent of children overimitated at
least one trial in this sample, and rates of overimitation increased
with age. Rationality ratings were collected to assess how
children perceived each action. Somewhat surprisingly, the
children who copied an unnecessary action subsequently rated
it as more irrational than those who did not copy it. Again, this
provides evidence against a causal learning explanation for
overimitation behaviour as children who understand that an
action is irrational (silly) are more likely to imitate that action.
This finding adds to the existing literature as previously, ratings
of actions have been taken prior to the child completing the
actions, and thus potentially influencing subsequent imitation
[15]. In addition, Kenward and colleagues [15] only included
children who overimitated and as such, could not demonstrate
the relationship between rationality ratings and behaviour that
this study has identified. Previous studies that find evidence in
support of the automatic causal encoding model have examined
children under five years old [5,9]. It is possible that over-
imitation in this young group is driven by causal reasoning, while
social factors dominate in older children as causal reasoning and
social skills develop.
Developmental Changes in Overimitation
This study explored overimitation over the 5–8 year old age
range. Like previous studies, we find that overimitation increases
with age [30] in a way that is inconsistent with a causal reasoning
explanation. Perhaps more interestingly we report two interactions
between age and the social manipulations in this study (namely
demonstration type and eye contact). In both of these interactions,
sensitivity to the social components of the task increases with age.
Previous studies that support automatic causal encoding hypoth-
esis have tested younger children (2–5 year olds) and found
persistence in overimitation despite social cues [5,9]. Again, this
data suggests that causal reasoning dominates responding in this
younger age group, while social cues are much more important in
the older children studied here. This should be investigated more
thoroughly in a wider age range of children.
Individual difference measures of verbal intelligence and social
ability did not predict overimitation. The lack of predictive power
of social ability was surprising, considering that the social features
of the task have a large influence on overimitation behaviour.
However, this sample did not include a full range of social abilities
and the SAS is a limited social measure. Studies examining
overimitation behaviour in a sample of children with autism have
yielded different results. Two previous studies have shown that
children with autism faithfully imitate inefficient tool selection and
use [23,44] but overimitation was absent in participants with
autism for visibly unnecessary actions with minimal causal
demands [20]. These differences indicate that the apparatus types
used have a huge bearing on social overimitation behaviour and
further work should investigate precisely what object features are
important for overimitation.
Limitations
We would like to acknowledge two limitations of the current
study. Firstly, due to the difficulty in developing appropriate
stimuli and restriction on experiment length, the number of eye
contact vs no eye contact trials was unbalanced within subject.
The analysis of this data on trial-by-trial basis minimises the
problems associated with unequal trial numbers and we believe the
results to be unaffected by this. Secondly, the use of familiar
objects in traditional imitation tasks is criticised [45] as partic-
ipants can act on their prior knowledge of the object and therefore,
it is difficult to distinguish imitative behaviour from normative
behaviour. Contrary to this argument, results from our study show
that despite object familiarity, children frequently complete
unnecessary actions which are unlikely to have been produced
without the demonstration of that action. We argue that in
overimitation paradigms, the use of familiar objects actually
strengthens our understanding of overimitation as causal reasoning
explanations can be eliminated.
Conclusions
The present study demonstrates that overimitation increases
with age and is modulated by social cues, even in a task with
minimal demands for causal reasoning. This argues against a pure
causal learning explanation of overimitation, and demonstrates
that social factors play a critical role in the decision about what to
imitate. Older children showed greater sensitivity to social cues,
demonstrating that development of social interaction skills
continues over the primary school years.
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